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THE DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT ACT
Executory Process: First Guaranty Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum
Center
Since its inception in the 1930's, the Louisiana Deficiency Judgment
Act' has prohibited a seizing creditor from obtaining a deficiency judgment
unless the property is sold with appraisal at a judicial sale. The Act has
been extended to private sales that were not provoked by the debtor. 2
Over the years the courts have created jurisprudential exceptions to the
applicability of the Act, many of which were enshrined in the 1986
amendments to the Act. 3
The tie between executory process and deficiency judgments originated
in the 1968 decision in League Central Credit Union v. Montgomery,' a
case in which the supreme court held that a fundamental defect in executory
proceedings will bar a later action for a deficiency judgment. Following
League Central, lower courts repeatedly were faced with determining the
availability of a deficiency judgment in certain recurring factual situations:
when there was a failure to attach the necessary authentic evidence to the
executory process petition;5 when there was an act that purported to be
authentic but in fact was not (e.g.. an act that appeared on its face to
be authentic but in fact was not signed in the presence of a notary and
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1. La. R.S. 13:4106-12 (1968 & Supp. 1988).
2. Home Fin. Serv. v. Walmsley, 176 So. 415 (La. Orl. 1937).
3. 1986 La. Acts No. 489, § 2.
4. 251 La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968).
5. Bank of St. Charles & Trust Co. v. Great S. Coach Corp., 424 So. 2d 462 (La.
App. 5th Cir. 1982); First Guar. Bank v. Ratcliff, 424 So. 2d 289 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1982), writ denied, 432 So. 2d 265 (1983); Mellon Fin. Serv. Corp. #7 v. Cassreino, 499
So. 2d 1160 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1986) (The lack of evidence of change of plaintiff's
corporate name invalidated deficiency judgment; but see, La. Code Civ. P. art. 2637,
legislatively overruling this result.); Tapp v. Guaranty Fin. Co., 158 So. 2d 228 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1963), writ refused, 245 La. 640, 160 So. 2d 228 (1964).
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two witnesses); 6 when there were problems with the appraisal process; 7 and
when there were allegations of defects in the wording of the petition for
executory process.8
In 1988 the supreme court reconsidered and overturned the League
Central rule in First Guaranty Bank v. Baton Rouge Petroleum Center,
Inc.9 In First Guaranty, the property was sold for two-thirds of its appraised
value following an executory proceeding with appraisal. The creditor did
not attach to its petition the corporate resolution authorizing the debtor
corporation to execute the mortgage, "although such a resolution ha[d]
been passed and filed in the public records when the mortgage was executed
and the agent named in the resolution had authority to execute the mort-
gage."' 0 Rather than raise this defect in the executory proceedings by an
injunction prior to the sale or through a suspensive appeal after the sale,
the debtor waited until after the creditor moved for a deficiency judgment
to allege that the failure to attach the resolution constituted a "fundamental
defect" that barred any deficiency.
The court rejected the rationale underlying League Central, reasoning
that it would be unfair to allow the debtor to wait until the termination
of the executory proceeding before raising a defense." The court noted
that a debtor who timely raises a defense may gain a release from the
debt; but, if there was a technical defect, the creditor could convert the
suit to ordinary process, obtain a judgment for the full amount due, and
enforce the mortgage on the property.' 2 The court found there was no
6. See, e.g., Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Walker, 488 So. 2d 209 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1986); League Cent. Credit Union v. Montgomery, 251 La. 971, 207 So. 2d 762 (1968);
Washington Bank & Trust Co. v. Hodge, 495 So. 2d 953 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1986) (clerk
of court's certificate found inadequate; but see, La. R.S. 13:3733(D), as amended by
1987 La. Acts. No. 478,.§ 1, and La. R.S. 13:4102(D), as amended by 1987 La. Acts
No. 855).
7. Citizens Bank of Ville Platte v. American Druggists Ins. Co., 471 So. 2d 1119
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1985); International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Majors, 467 So. 2d
1251 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1985); Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Douglas, 448 So. 2d 817
(La. App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 450 So. 2d 360 (1984). Credithrift of America, Inc. v.
Williams, 426 So. 2d 339 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1983); Ardoin v. Fontenot, 374 So. 2d 1273
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1979); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boutte, 338 So. 2d 363
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Blackwell, 295 So. 2d 522 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 299 So. 2d 362 (1974); Bourgeois v. Sazdoff, 209 So. 2d 320 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1968). But, cf. General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Mergist, 520 So. 2d
1109 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987), writ denied, 522 So. 2d 566 (1988); John Deere Co. v.
Loewer, 505 So. 2d 973 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
8. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Stout, 404 So. 2d 304 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981); Neff
v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 347 So. 2d 1228 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1977).
9. 529 So. 2d 834 (La. 1987).
10. Id. at 844 (on rehearing).
11. On original hearing the court had upheld the lower courts' ruling that the defect
in executory process abrogated the creditor's right to a deficiency judgment.
12. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2644.
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"reason in law or logic that a diligent debtor should be penalized for
exercising the defenses in the manner specifically provided by law, i.e.,
by appeal or injunction," while the debtor who waited until the deficiency
proceedings could receive a windfall release from the debt. The court
reasoned that although the public policy behind the Deficiency Judgment
Act "is broad and strong, there is nothing in its history or expression
that indicates an intention to bar a creditor who fully complies with
appraisal requirements from obtaining a deficiency judgment simply because
of a lack of authentic evidence in the executory proceedings." 3
First Guaranty allows a deficiency judgment to be obtained if the
appraisal process is appropriate and if valid authentic evidence is available,
even if the authentic evidence is not attached to the original petition. It
is not clear, however, whether courts will read First Guaranty broadly,
beyond its specific holding. If a creditor uses a document that appears
to be authentic on its face but is later found to be deficient, courts may
reach differing conclusions depending on whether the creditor was aware
of the defect. If the seizing creditor had no knowledge that what purported
to be authentic was not in fact authentic, the rationale underlying First
Guaranty would lead one to conclude that a deficiency judgment would
not be barred unless the debtor raised the defense prior to the sale. On
the other hand, if a creditor uses executory process on the basis of a
document that he knows is not authentic, although it appears to be
authentic on its face, courts may find that such a creditor not only should
be barred from receiving a deficiency judgment, but also should be liable
for damages for wrongful seizure.
It is possible that a defect in the appraisal process may bar a subsequent
deficiency judgment, notwithstanding First Guaranty, for First Guaranty
applies only to a creditor "who fully complies with the appraisal process. '1 4
The type of defect may affect whether the bar to a deficiency judgment
will be sustained. A technical defect, such as an appraisal that is improperly
signed or untimely delivered, may be one that requires the debtor to raise
the defense timely, prior to the sale. Indeed, because a debtor has the
ability to appoint his own appraiser 5 even a defect so severe as an improper
appraisal may not be a sound basis for barring a deficiency judgment.
In that instance, the failure of the debtor to act on his own, or to raise
the improper appraisal timely, may give rise to the same type of "diligent
debtor" argument that First Guaranty found so appealing. 6
Defects in the allegations of the petition for executory process present
a different type of problem. Since there is no service of process and
13. 529 So. 2d at 843 (on rehearing).
14. Id. at 844.
15. See La. R.S. 13:4363 (1968 & Supp. 1988)..
16. 529 So. 2d at 843. See, e.g., Bank of New Roads v. Livonia S., Inc., 527 So.
2d 1132 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
1988]
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citation in executory proceedings, 7 courts may be required to consider
how a debtor, who may never see the petition, can be deemed to know
of the defects. The answer may turn on whether the defect is obvious
and discoverable from inspection of the pleadings, such as an incorrect
description or calculation.
Continued Questions of Constitutionality: The Possible Effects of First
Guaranty
Buckner and Executory Process
While First Guaranty may be seen by some secured creditors as a
boon, for it helps those who have "technical" defects in their pleadings
obtain deficiency judgments, it could work to their detriment by renewing
evaluation of the constitutionality of Louisiana's executory process. The
United States Supreme Court has considered Louisiana's executory process
provisions on at least eight occasions. On three occasions the Court decided
the cases on solely procedural grounds; on the remaining five occasions
the Court approved Louisiana's executory proceedings either explicitly or
implicitly. 11
In Buckner v. Carmack, 9 the Louisiana Supreme Court specifically
held executory process constitutional. In sustaining the validity of Louis-
iana's executory proceedings against a due process attack, the court found
the following factors relevant: the writ of seizure must be served on the
debtor; there is a confession of judgment clause that "effectively waives
the right to a routine adversary hearing";20 Louisiana procedure allows
the debtor to enjoin the sale without bond "on numerous grounds"; 2 '
and, there is a "suspensive appeal from the order of seizure and sale, an
injunction with bond under article 3610 of the Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure and an action in nullity after the judicial sale." '22
Buckner was decided more than two decades after the landmark de-
cision in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,23 a case that
involved the problem of adequate notice under the due process clause,
and only a few years after the decision in Sniadach v. Family Finance
17. See La. Code Civ. P. art. 2640.
18. The procedural cases are Fleitis v. Richardson, 147 U.S. 550, 13 S. Ct. 495
(1893); Marin v. Lalley, 17 Wall 14 (1872); and Levy v. Fitzpatrick, 15 Pet. 167 (1841).
The substantive cases are Carmack v. Buckner, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974);
Ross v. Brown Title Corp., 412 U.S. 934, 93 S. Ct. 2788 (1973); E. Nalle & Co. v.
Young, 160 U.S. 624, 16 S. Ct. 420 (1896); New Orleans Nat'l Banking Ass'n v. LeBreton,
120 U.S. 765, 7 S. Ct. 772 (1887) and Carite v. Trotot, 105 U.S. 751 (1882).
19. 272 So. 2d 326 (1973), writ refused, 417 U.S. 901, 94 S. Ct. 2594 (1974).
20. Id. at 330.
21. Id at 331.
22. Id.
23. 339 U.S. 306, 70 S. Ct. 652 (1950).
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Corp.24 and Fuentes v. Shevin. 25 In fact, the Supreme Court dismissed the
application for certiorari in Buckner one week after its decision in Mitchell
v. W. T. Grant & Co., 26 a case in which the Court upheld Louisiana's
sequestration procedures.
Sniadach, Fuentes, and Mitchell all dealt with the validity of pre-
judgment seizures of property. Sniadach invalidated Wisconsin's garnish-
ment procedures because no provision was made for notice or a prior
hearing. Similarly, the Court held Florida's and Pennsylvania's replevein
statutes unconstitutional in Fuentes because the statutory hearing was
inadequate and did not provide for an evaluation by a "neutral official."
Mitchell found the Louisiana sequestration provisions valid, on the other
hand, mainly because the procedure was subject to judicial control from
"beginning to end," '27 and because the debtor was "not at the mercy of
unsupervised court functionaries. "28
While Buckner did not rely expressly on the "neutral official" argument
in sustaining executory process, implicit in Buckner is the notion that an
impartial state judicial official should review the documents before an
order of seizure is issued, because this review protects a judgment debtor's
rights and makes the seizure consistent with procedural due process prin-
ciples. The Buckner court also may have assumed that, if some discrepancy
in the proceedings was not caught by the judge, League Central would
protect the debtor by barring any subsequent deficiency judgment. 29
Post-Buckner Developments
The United States Supreme Court has continually addressed procedural
due process claims since its decisions in the cases decided prior to Buckner.
For example, in Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks the Court discussed what
kind of state action is needed to trigger a due process claim, and in Lugar
v. Edmonston3 ' the Court described how one ascertains whether there is
state action.32 Just as the 1950 opinion in Mullane is a watershed mark
in the procedural due process jurisprudence, the 1983 decision in Mennonite
Board of Missions v. AdamSr 3 is a watershed mark in the area of the
24. 395 U.S. 337, 89 S. Ct. 1820 (1969).
25. 407 U.S. 67, 92 S. Ct. 1983 (1972).
26. 416 U.S. 600, 94 S. Ct. 1895 (1974).
27. Id. at 616, 94 S. Ct. at 1905.
28. Id., 94 S. Ct. at 1904.
29. It must be remembered that Buckner was decided only five years after League
Central.
30. 436 U.S. 149, 98 S. Ct. 1729 (1978).
31. 457 U.S. 922, 102 S. Ct. 2744 (1982).
32. For recent cases holding that there is not sufficient state action to trigger a due
process claim, see Daniel v. Ferguson, 839 F.2d 1124 (5th Cir. 1988); Mildfelt v. Circuit
Court of Jackson County, Missouri, 827 F.2d 343 (8th Cir. 1987).
33. 462 U.S. 791, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
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procedural due process right to notice. A complete analysis of Mennonite
will not be made here.34 Suffice it to say that Mennonite held that a tax
sale statute which did not provide notice to secured creditors, violated
procedural due process. Although Mennonite has been extended to con-
ventional foreclosures,35 Louisiana's executory process statutes may still be
constitutional; there are provisions allowing secured creditors to request
notice of a seizure and sale. 36
During its last term, the Supreme Court, relying upon Mennonite,
declared that the unsecured creditor of a deceased who does not receive
actual notice of the probate proceedings may not be adversely affected
by any judgment rendered as a result of those proceedings.37 In another
case, the Court invalidated a default judgment taken after defective service
of process, even though the defendant had no defense on the merits.38
The court expressly relied upon Mullane.
The law in the area of due process and creditor's rights shows that
courts are not reluctant to sustain such claims, even in the absence of a
defense on the merits. In other words, it is the defective procedure itself
that gives rise to the constitutional claim. The fact that, if the procedure
were valid, the defendant would not have had any other defense is irrelevant
for due process purposes.
Future Due Process Attacks
Because the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in First Guaranty
allows a creditor to get a deficiency judgment even when the judge who
signs the order has overlooked the obvious absence of necessary authentic
evidence, debtors may renew due process challenges to Louisiana's exec-
utory procedures. If the judge, as an impartial state official who supposedly
protects the debtor's procedural due process rights, is not in fact required
to scrutinize the executory process documents fully and carefully, and if
a debtor can be liable for the entire deficiency even though the proceedings
were procedurally defective, then the decision in Buckner may be open to
reexamination.
Ordinary Proceedings and Deficiency Judgments
In a case of first impression, the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
the Deficiency Judgment Act applies only to sales by executory process,
34. See Rubin and Carter, Notice of Seizure and Mortgage Foreclosures and Tax
Sales Proceedings: The Ramifications of Mennonite, 48 La. L. Rev. 536 (1988).
35. Mennonite has been extended to conventional foreclosures by the Louisiana Su-
preme Court in Magee v. Amiss, 502 So. 2d 568 (La. 1987); and by federal courts, see,
e.g., Midstate Homes v. Portis, 652 F. Supp. 640 (W.D. La. 1987).
36. See La. R.S. 13:3886, discussed in Rubin & Carter, supra note 34; see also
Midstate Homes, 652 F. Supp. 640.
37. Tulsa Professional Collection Serv. v. Pope, 108 S. Ct. 1340 (1988).
38. Peralta v. Height Medical Center, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 896 (1988).
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not to sales in ordinary process suits following a seizure by a writ of fieri
facias. In Guaranty Bank of Mamou v. Community Rice Mill,39 a creditor
used ordinary process, but the appraisal was untimelyA° If the sale had
been by executory process, the case law would have barred the creditor
from obtaining a deficiency judgment." The question in this instance was
whether the result should be different because the sale was by ordinary,
rather than executory, process. The court, answering that question in the
affirmative, allowed the creditor to sue for the deficiency.
Community Rice Mill seems to have been a precursor of First Guar-
anty's narrowing of the Deficiency Judgment Act. The Community Rice
Mill court may have believed that there could be no windfall to a creditor
in an ordinary suit. In First Guaranty, the court expressed this belief when
it indicated that the Deficiency Judgment Act prevents a creditor from
obtaining both the property being foreclosed upon and a large deficiency.
42
It would be a mistake, however, to assume that a creditor cannot
obtain a windfall in an ordinary proceeding. Suppose, for example, that
Debtor owes Creditor $100,000.00, and that Creditor's security consists of
a $100,000.00 first mortgage on Blackacre and the continuing guaranties
of sureties, S, and S2. At the time of Debtor's default, Blackacre is worth
$90,000.00. If Creditor proceeds by ordinary process, an appraisal will be
required. 43 Creditor can go to the first sale and bid the property in for
two-thirds of the appraised value (in this case $60,000.00, two-thirds of
the fair market value of $90,000.00).4 If the appraisal is valid, and if
Creditor is the sole bidder, as is often the case in foreclosures, he not
only now owns a piece of property worth $90,000.00, but may also collect
39. 502 So. 2d 1067 (La. 1987). The author was counsel to one of the parties in
this case. The author hopes that his role as a litigator in the case has not colored his
views, but those reading this article should be aware of his involvement.
40. At the time the case arose, appraisals had to be completed within seven but not
less than two days before the sale was scheduled. La. R.S. 13:4363 (before amendment
by 1982 La. Acts No. 836).
41. See, e.g., Massey-Ferguson Credit Corp. v. Douglas, 448 So. 2d 817 (La. App.
2d Cir.), writ denied, 450 So. 2d 360 (1984).
42. The First Guaranty court stated:
Prior to the first deficiency judgment act in 1934, in any period of economic
recession a mortgagee could buy in a mortgagor's property for a small fraction
of the indebtedness, obtain a personal judgment for the deficiency, and under
execution of the judgment have other property of the mortgagor sold. This evil
was effectively curbed by the Deficiency Judgment Action of 1934, which requires
as a condition precedent to a deficiency judgment that the property must have
been appraised before its sale, thus affording a measure of protection against
an unjust sacrifice of the debtor's property.
529 So. 2d 834, 844.
43. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2332.
44. Id. art. 2336.
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the remaining $40,000.00 from the Debtor, S, or S2 o4 1 Creditor has received
a potential windfall of $30,000.00:
$100,000.00 Debt
minus $ 60,000.00 Bid Price
$ 40,000.00 Deficiency
$ 40,000.00 Deficiency Collected
plus $ 90,000.00 Value of Property Foreclosed On
and Owned
$130,000.00 Total Property and Deficiency
Collected by Creditor
$130,000.00 Total Collected by Creditor
minus $100,000.00 Debt Owed
$ 30,000.00 Potential Windfall
If Creditor does not bid on the property at the first sale, he then
may proceed to the second sale. At that sale the minimum bid would be
only the costs of the proceedings, assuming that the foreclosing creditor
has a first mortgage. 6 There is no requirement that Creditor impute any
of the bid price to the debt. Thus, if no one bids against him, the Creditor
can recover property worth $90,000.00, apply none of the bid price to
the debt, and collect the remaining $100,000.00 from Debtor. Creditor's
potential windfall in this case is $90,000.00:
$100,000.00 Debt
minus $ 0.00 Portion of Bid Attributed to Debt
$100,000.00 Deficiency
$100,000.00 Deficiency Collected
plus $ 90,000.00 Value of Property Foreclosed On
and Owned
$190,000.00 Total Property and Deficiency
Collected by Creditor
$190,000.00 Total Collected by Creditor
minus $100,000.00 Debt Owed
$ 90,000.00 Potential Windfall
Thus, ordinary proceedings may result in windfalls to creditors.
45. Community Rice Mill involved a surety's heirs who were raising claims of defects
in the sale. The surety's rights, when there is a flawed appraisal process or a windfall
to the creditor, are limited. Numerous Louisiana decisions have held that a surety need
not be named in a sales proceeding, receive notice of the sale, or have a chance to
appoint an appraiser. See Colonial Bank v. Pier Five, Inc., 469 So. 2d 1029 (La. App.
4th Cir.), writ denied, 475 So. 2d 363 (1985); Whitney Nat'l Bank of New Orleans v.
Derbes, 436 So. 2d 1185 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Soileau,
323 So. 2d 221 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975). On the other hand, the surety will be released
if the creditor cannot get a deficiency judgment against the principal debtor. See, e.g.,
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Smith, 399 So. 2d 1285 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1981);
General Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Boutte, 338 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976);
C.I.T. Corp. v. Rosenstock, 205 So. 2d 81 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
46. La. Code Civ. P. art. 2337.
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Although courts continue to allow creditors to proceed to second sales
and collect deficiencies, 47 it remains to be seen whether the supreme court
will re-examine the Community Rice Mill ruling if it finds that a creditor
routinely goes to a second sale in order to collect a deficiency.4 Certainly,
a creditor should be able to recoup from whatever sources all of the
debtor's contractual obligations, including interest and attorney's fees. It
is another thing, however, for a creditor to routinely use mechanisms that
result in his receiving more than he could have obtained if the debtor
had paid the debt voluntarily in accordance with their original agreement.
The ability of a creditor to act in a manner that assures a windfall
may be cause for future courts to re-examine both the applicability of
the Deficiency Judgment Act to the second sale procedure and Community
Rice Mill's holding that the Deficiency Judgment Act does not apply to
ordinary process suits.
Out-Of-State Sales and Deficiency Judgments
In several recent cases, debtors have attempted to use the Deficiency
Judgment Act either to prevent out-of-state foreclosures or to defend
against deficiency judgments resulting from out-of-state foreclosures. The
1986 amendments to the Deficiency Judgment Act specifically allow the
rendering of a deficiency judgment if the out-of-state foreclosure took
place in accordance with the rules of the state in which the foreclosure
occurred, notwithstanding the fact that there may have been no appraisal. 49
In Jones v. Jones,50 the debtor, relying on the Deficiency Judgment
Act, sought to halt a Georgia foreclosure on the ground that the creditor
allegedly had disposed of other out-of-state collateral through nonjudicial
sales. Finding that Louisiana law could not control out-of-state procedures,
the court refused to grant the debtor relief. Not before the court was the
issue of whether a deficiency judgment would have been available in
47. See, e.g., Louisiana National Bank v. Heroman, 280 So. 2d 362 (La. App. 1st
Cir.), writ denied, 281 So. 2d 755 (1973).
48. Lower courts have followed Community Rice Mill. See, e.g., LaSalle State Bank
v. Roberts, 517 So. 2d 986 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987). In Associates Commercial Corp. v.
Vick's Sand Pit and Dredging Co., 522 So. 2d 663 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 525
So. 2d 1056 (1988). Community Rice Mill was followed without question even though
the defendant claimed that the appraisal process itself was flawed.
49. See La. R.S. 13:4108(4) (Supp. 1988), as enacted by 1986 La. Acts No. 489,
which provides:
The mortgagee's or other creditor's exercise of its rights against property subject
to a mortgage, pledge, privilege, or encumbrance in favor of such creditor,
when the property or collateral is located outside the state of Louisiana, and
the creditor has elected to proceed under the laws of the state, county, or
territory where the property or collateral is then located to seize or sell such
property or collateral.
50. 523 So. 2d 874 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1988).
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Louisiana after the completion of the Georgia foreclosure. In light of
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:4108, the creditor would have a strong
claim.51
Interfirst Bank Clifton v. Fernandez2 involved the interrelationship of
the Federal Aviation Act,53 Louisiana procedural laws, and contractual
waivers of the Deficiency Judgment Act. A Texas bank financed the sale
of an airplane located in Louisiana. The loan documents (but not the
Louisiana chattel mortgage) contained not only a Texas choice-of-law clause
in which the borrower consented to a sale under Texas foreclosure pro-
cedures, but also a clause describing the method of determining the de-
ficiency after the sale. The creditor took a Louisiana collateral chattel
mortgage to secure the financing. Upon default, the plane was flown to
Texas and sold there in accordance with the loan documents and Texas
law.
The court, in its original opinion, relying on La. R.S. 13:4108(4), held
that the FAA rules and regulations do not preempt all state-passed statues,
the debtor's consent to foreclosure under the laws of another state was
valid, stating:
Fernandez made completely clear his intent to submit to a Texas
foreclosure under the Texas law. This specific waiver of the rights
he may have had under Louisiana law is not forbidden under the
federal statute. Louisiana itself does not have the power to deprive
another state of its lawful jurisdiction over the foreclosure sale
by forbidding the waiver of rights under Louisiana law.
We find, therefore, that the specific waiver by Fernandez of the
application of Louisiana law to the foreclosure of the aircraft was
permissible and was effective under both federal and Louisiana
law. 5
4
On rehearing, the court deleted this language from the opinion, but
the result remained the same. The court held that the contractual validity
of aircraft security interests is governed by the Federal Aviation Act, 49
U.S.C. § 1406. That Act, the court stated, concerns validity and perfection
requirements, not foreclosure procedures. Texas conflict of laws rules,
along with the debtor's written consent to a Texas foreclosure, controlled.
51. See La. R.S. 13:4108 (1968 & Supp. 1988); La. Code Civ. P. art. 2725.
52. 844 F.2d 279, amended on rehearing, 853 F.2d 292 (5th Cir. 1988).
53. 49 U.S.C. § 1406 (1982).




"Oral" Amplification of Suretyship Agreements
A contract of suretyship, which creates an accessory obligation, 5 must
be in writing, and parol evidence is inadmissible to prove suretyship. 6
These factors often create problems when closely held businesses are unable
to pay their debts. The creditor may desire to hold the business owner
personally liable, and the owner's defense is that one cannot be liable
absent a written suretyship agreement. It is sometimes said, erroneously,
that in such instances parol testimony is admissible if the owner has some
personal pecuniary or financial interest in the loan.
The correct rule, which was set forth in Seashell, Inc. v. Simon,5 7 is
that parol evidence is admissible only to prove that the debtor has un-
dertaken a primary, as opposed to an accessory, obligation. Seashell, Inc.
represents the proper approach because a suretyship contract is in essence
an agreement in which the surety says, "If the debtor does not pay, I
will." Suretyship is by nature an accessory obligation, and when one
alleges that the essence of the third party's contract with the creditor is
accessory, the rules of suretyship should apply. Only if the obligation
created by the oral agreement is not dependent upon another obligation
can parol evidence possibly be introduced." The reason for this strict parol
evidence rule, which has remained unchanged for 130 years,5 9 is clear: the
55. La. Civ. Code art. 3035.
56. See La. Civ. Code art. 1847.
57. 398 So. 2d 99 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981).
58. Louisiana cases are legion on the types of written contracts that are not sufficient
to create a suretyship because they did not amount to the claim: "If the debtor does
not pay, I will." For cases in which the language was and was not held sufficient to
create a contract of suretyship, see, e.g., Ball Mktg. Enter. v. Rainbow Tomato Co., 340
So. 2d 700 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976); Livingston State Bank & Trust Co. v. Steel-Tek,
Inc., 335 So. 2d 482 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976); Exchange Nat'l Bank v. Waldron Lumber
Co., 177 La. 1015, 150 So. 3 (1933); Lobre v. Pointz, 5 Mart. 443 (La. 1827).
Contrast these cases to ones in which the language was held insufficient to create a
written contract of suretyship, e.g., Boro Indus. v. Culotta, Inc., 336 So. 2d 878 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 163 La. 933, 113 So. 152
(1927); Trefethen v. Locke, 16 La. Ann. 19 (1861); Menard & Vigneaud v. Scudder &
Stewart, 7 La. Ann. 385 (1852); Hickey v. Dudley, 9 Rob. 502 (La. 1845); Bell v.
Norwood, 7 La. 95 (1834); Herries v. Canfield, 9 Mart. 385 (La. 1821); Amory v. Boyd,
5 Mart. 414 (La. 1818).
59. La. Civ. Code art. 1847. This article reproduces the substance of La. Civ. Code
art. 2278 (1870). It followed the language of R.S. §§ 1441-44, 2818, and 2821, as enacted
by 1858 La. Acts No. 208 and was introduced in the 1870 revision of the Civil Code.
Its text reflects the influence of the common law Statute of Frauds. See 12 Ch. 2 (1676).




essence of a contract of suretyship is gratuitous6° and thus should be
construed in such a way as to release the surety whenever there is a
question of doubt. Because it is gratuitous, the written contract is required
to make the suretyship contract valid even as between the parties.
In Smith v. Anderson,6' the court did not follow this analysis and
found an oral enforceable principal obligation even though the creditor
alleged that the obligation was in essence a "guarantee." In Smith, the
owner and president of Seaways International, Inc., Anderson, went to
an attorney to defend Seaways in a suit. Even though he was not a party
to the suit against Seaways, it was not clear to the court whether Anderson
acted on "his own behalf or on behalf of Seaways." There was no written
contract between the attorney and either Seaways or Anderson.
In finding that Anderson personally had to pay the attorney, the court
stated, "It is only reasonable to believe that [the attorney] would not
represent a client without some assurance of being compensated.' '62 While
perhaps a court can take judicial notice of this "fact," the interest of an
attorney in being compensated does not provide a legal basis for enforcing
what would otherwise be an attempted contract of suretyship.
The court in Smith also noted: "The facts establish, and it is also
reasonable to believe, particularly in the absence of any rebuttal evidence,
that Anderson, being the sole owner of the corporation, was sufficiently
financially interested and motivated to undertake primary liability. '63 As
Seashell had pointed out, however, the fact that someone may be "suf-
ficiently financially interested and motivated" to become a primary obligor
does not prove that he in fact is a primary obligor. The issue is not
whether he had an interest in making a principal obligation; the issue is
whether he made an accessory obligation.
It is interesting that in the Smith case the attorney's own affidavit
stated: "Anderson assured Affiant that since Seaways ... would not be
able to compensate Affiant for his professional services and. expense, that
he, the said ... Anderson, would guarantee and personally pay Affiant
for his professional services and expenses." 64 The affidavit appears to show
that the agreement was not a principal obligation because the attorney
claimed that Anderson's agreement was a "guarantee." Since at least 1861,
Louisiana courts have held that a "guarantee" is the equivalent of a
contract of suretyship. 65 Under settled law, then, the court should have
refused parol evidence, for an accessary obligation, such as a contract of
60. 2 M. Planiol, Trait6 l16mentaire de Droit Civil, pt. 1, no. 2324, at 336 (11th
ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1939).
61. 517 So. 2d 926 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1987).
62. Id. at 927.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Trefethen v. Locke, 16 La. Ann. 19 (1861).
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suretyship, cannot be proved by parol under the Seashell rule. Perhaps
the result of the case can be explained not so much by the court's legal
analysis as by the fact that the defendant "failed to file any counter-
affidavit, documents or depositions, and even failed to appear at the
hearing on the motion for summary judgment."
A different parol evidence problem arose in Placid Refining Co.
v. Privette.67 After the parties entered into a continuing guaranty
agreement before a notary public, a dispute arose about the proper
construction of the guaranty and what debts it secured. The trial court
had granted summary judgment, but the court of appeal reversed and,
on rehearing, remanded the case "in the interest of justice" for the
admission of affidavits and depositions. 6 The remand order is curious
given the fact that there existed a written contract of suretyship. The
appeal court reasoned that, under general contractual principles, parol
evidence can be used to prove the "true intent" of the parties. 69 This
rule, however, should not apply to contracts of suretyship, because all
necessary intent must be expressed in a written instrument. 70
It is submitted that the correct rule would be to exclude any parol
evidence to explain, amplify, expand, or restrict a written contract of
suretyship, even if the dispute is solely between the parties. If the
contract is ambiguous in any respect, it should be narrowly construed
against the creditor. If it is unambiguous, however, the debtor should
be bound by the written agreement into which he entered. 7'
66. 517 So. 2d at 927 (Guidry, J., concurring).
67. 523 So. 2d 865 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 524 So. 2d 748 (1988).
68. Id. at 869.
69. Id. at 868.
70. The difficulty with the Privette approach is that, while it may be true that
contracts in general need not be in writing to exist, this analysis may not be applicable
when the contract cannot even exist unless it is in writing. In such cases, the writing is
the contract, and if the contract is ambiguous, that is the fault of the drafter and the
agreement should be construed against him. See La. Civ. Code art. 1847 (1985): "Parol
evidence is inadmissible to establish . . . a promise to pay a debt of a third person."
See also 1984 La. Acts No. 331, Official Comment (h) (1985): "This Article does not
intend any change in the law of suretyship. See La. Civ. Code arts. 3038 and 3039
(1870);" cf. La. Civ. Code art. 3039 (1870): "Suretyship cannot be presumed; it ought
to be express, and is to be restrained within the limits intended by the contract."; La.
Civ. Code art. 3038 (1988), as amended by 1987 La. Acts No. 409: "Suretyship must be
express and in writing." Official Comment (a) to this 1987 revision provides: "This Article
restates the rules contained in C.C. Art. 3039 (1870) and C.C. Art. 1847 (Rev. 1984)."
71. FDIC v. Cardinal Oil Well Serv. Co., 837 F.2d 1369 (5th Cir. 1988) is illustrative
of this approach. In a case under Texas and New Mexico law, unambiguous continuing
guarantees were enforced according to their terms, even in the face of a claim that the
guarantors had been misled by the creditor on the scope of the guaranty. While the case
involved the FDIC "bar statute" (12 U.S.C. § 1823(e) (Supp. 1988)), the analysis that
parol evidence need not be considered is similar to the result that should obtain under
Louisiana Law.
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Suretyship and Solidary Obligations
Before the 1987 amendments to the suretyship articles, the Louis-
iana jurisprudence had created a series of rules in an area which it
termed "solidary suretyship." ' 72 The problem of whether to apply the
law of suretyship, solidary obligations, or negotiable instruments sup-
posedly was put to rest by those amendments. Now, article 3037
provides:
One who ostensibly binds himself as a principal obligor to
satisfy the present or future obligations of another is none-
theless considered a surety if the principal cause of the contract
with the creditor is to guarantee performance of such obli-
gations.
A creditor in whose favor a surety and principal obligor
are bound together as principal obligors in solido may presume
they are equally concerned in the matter until he clearly knows
of their true relationship.
In matters arising before the effective date of the 1987 revisions,
the problem of which law applies to accomodation endorsers of ne-
gotiable notes has led different courts to inconsistent results and legal
analyses. There are at least three potential solutions to the treatment
of an accomodation party on a negotiable instrument containing so-
lidary language: one could apply solely the Louisiana Commercial Laws
(the Louisiana term for those portions of the Uniform Commercial
Code (U.C.C.) that Louisiana has adopted); one could apply solely
the Civil Code articles on suretyship; or one could apply solely the
Civil Code articles on solidary obligations. Louisiana courts so far
have failed to adopt a consistent approach to the problem.
For example, in Sims v. Asian International, Ltd. ,7 the court used
this puzzling language to explain its position: 74 "Thus, as to the cred-
72. See First Nat'l Bank of Crowley v. Green Garden Processing Co., 387 So. 2d
1070 (La. 1980); Aiavolasiti v. Versailles Gardens Land Dev. Co., 371 So. 2d 755 (La.
1979); Louisiana Bank & Trust Co., Crowley v. Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975); See
generally Harrell, The Work of Appellate Courts, 1974-1975, 36 La. L. Rev. 437 (1976);
Rubin, Developments in the Law, 1980-1981 -Security Devices, 42 La. L. Rev. 413, 416-
21 (1982); Schewe, Debtors in Solido: On Plain Language and Uncertainty with Mention
of the Revocatory Action, 32 Loy. L. Rev. 13 (1986); Note, Aiavolasiti: A Conflict
Resolved, A Conflict Ignored, 40 La. L. Rev. 483 (1979); Note, Green Garden: Short
Shrift for the Solidary Surety, 41 La. L. Rev. 968 (1981); Note, Rights of the Solidary
Surety: Louisiana Bank & Trust v. Boutte, 36 La. L. Rev. 279 (1975). Comment, Article
3045 and Solidary Suretyship, 39 Tul. L. Rev. 85 (1964).
73. 521 So. 2d 411 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987), writ denied, 523 So. 2d 1337 (1988).
74. The facts in Sims are complex. There was a note with a number of accommodation
endorsers. The note said that all endorsers were liable in solido with the maker. The
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itor, the rules of suretyship apply to accommodation parties. Among
themselves, the rules of solidary obligations apply to accommodation
parties." 75 This statement appears to be contrary to both the official
U.C.C. comments on accomodation parties76 and the AiavolasitP7 opin-
ion. Aiavolasiti, which interpreted the law prior to the 1987 amend-
ments to the Civil Code, had held that the Civil Code articles on
solidary obligations were to be applied to the surety-creditor relation-
ship while the suretyship articles were to be applied to the surety-
surety and surety-principal relationships.
On rehearing, the Sims court declared that it had been "incorrect
in stating that the relationship between a creditor and a solidary surety
is governed by the articles of the Civil Code on solidary obligations." 78
This statement appears to be contrary to the direct holding of Louisiana
Bank & Trust Co. v. Boutte.79 In that case the supreme court stated:
"The effect of the application of these articles is that, as between the
creditor and the solidary surety, the obligations of the surety are
governed by the rules of solidary obligors.*** Among the co-obligors,
however, bound in solido, the legal relationship may be governed by
the rules of suretyship."18 0 Aiavolasiti adopted this position.
The Sims court further held that an impairment of the right of
subrogation releases the accommodation party, relying on Louisiana
Revised Statutes 10:3-606 (U.C.C. article 3-606). Compare this pro-
vision with the old suretyship articles of the Civil Code, which provided
that the surety was released only to the extent of the impairment.
The following chart is a guide to the differing rules under the old
Civil Code articles, the 1987 revisions to the Civil Code articles on
suretyship, the Civil Code articles on solidary obligors, and the U.C.C.
(Louisiana's "Commercial Laws").
holder had apparently (the original opinion and the opinion on rehearing are not clear
on this point) entered into a transaction with one of the makers either to get a consent
judgment, obtain a partial payment and add new guarantors, or to release that same
maker and some of the maker's collateral.
The court on- rehearing found that the release of the maker and the maker's collateral
was an "impairment of subrogation" that discharged the accommodation parties under
U.C.C. § 3-606 (La. R.S. 10:3-606 (1983 & Supp. 1988)).
The result may be justified if the maker was in fact released, for neither an accom-
modation party nor a surety should be liable to the creditor if the principal obligor is
not bound. But see, First Nat'l Bank of Crowley v. Green Garden Processing Co., 387
So. 2d 1070 (La. 1980).
75. 521 So. 2d at 413.
76. U.C.C. § 3-415, Official Comment (1987).
77. 371 So. 2d 755 (La. 1979).
78. 521 So. 2d at 413.
79. 309 So. 2d 274 (La. 1975).
80. Id. at 278.
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It is submitted that the proper rule when there is an accomodation
endorser is to look first to the U.C.C. If the U.C.C. contains an
applicable provision, then the rules of the U.C.C. should be applied
because a negotiable instrument is a contract which incorporates all of
the U.C.C. rules by reference."' If the U.C.C. is silent, then what law
81. McHenry State Bank v. Y & A Trucking, Inc., 454 N.E.2d 345 (I1. App. 2 Dist.
1983).
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governs may depend upon the time at which the parties entered into
the contract. If the parties entered into the contract prior to the 1987
amendments, then the rules of solidarity should apply to the creditor-
surety relationship 2 (if the contract imparts a solidary relationship) and
the rules of suretyship should apply to the maker-accommodation party
relationship.83 On the other hand, if the parties entered into the contract
after January 1, 1988, the effective date of the 1987 amendments, then
the provisions of new article 3037 should apply.
Under article 3037, if the creditor knows that the endorser is merely
an accommodation party, the creditor must treat him as a surety. If
the creditor does not know that the endorser is an accommodation party,
however, and if that accommodation party appears to be a solidary
obligor, then the creditor may treat him as such. The only exception
is that one who signs on the back of an instrument as an accommodation
party clearly does so in an accommodation capacity, notwithstanding
"solidary" language on the face of the note. Article 3037 mandates that
the creditor treat this accommodation endorser as a surety (as opposed
to an accommodation co-maker). An accommodation co-maker on the
face of an instrument could be treated as principally liable under article
3037 if the holder does not know of the accommodation nature of the
co-maker's liability.
MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE AND THE APPRAIsAL PROCESS
An inferior creditor whose security interest does not cover all of
the property upon which a superior creditor is foreclosing must decide
whether to intervene in the foreclosure and seek a separate appraisal.
The inferior creditor who does not intervene and seek a separate appraisal
arguably runs the risk of collecting nothing from the foreclosure pro-
ceeds, even if the sales price is greater than that needed to pay off the
seizing creditor.
Code of Civil Procedure article 1092 allows an inferior creditor to
intervene in ongoing foreclosure proceedings at any time prior to the
sheriff's distribution of funds if his mortgage is "on the entire property
seized." If the inferior mortgage is on only part of the property being
seized and the inferior creditor intervenes before the sale,
the court may order the separate sale of the property on which
the intervenor claims a mortgage or privilege; or if a separate
sale thereof is not feasible or necessary, or the intervenor has
no right thereto, the court may order the separate appraisement
82. See Boutte, 309 So. 2d 274.
83. See Aiavolasiti, 371 So. 2d 755.
19881
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of the entire property seized and of the property thereof on
which the intervenor claims a mortgage or privilege.
First National Bank of Commerce v. Crochet 4 involved two second
mortgage holders. A house was built on two lots in Orleans Parish,
Lot 154 and Lot 155. First National Bank of Commerce held a first
mortgage on both lots, Greater New Orleans Homestead Association
held a second mortgage on Lot 155, and State Bank of Commerce held
a second mortgage on Lot 154 and a third mortgage on Lot 155.
Although the sales proceeds were sufficient to pay off the first mortgage,
they were not sufficient to pay off both of the second mortgage holders.
In a Solomonic decision, the court split the proceeds equally between
the two second mortgage holders. 5
While the result in Crochet may be equitable under the particular
circumstances, it is not a decision that is legally compelled, and it may
discourage second mortgage holders from intervening and seeking a
separate appraisal. For example, assume that Debtor owns Greenacre,
a tract of land consisting of 100 acres. Creditor A has a $100,000.00
first mortgage on all of Greenacre. Creditor B has a second mortgage
on a portion of Greenacre consisting of 25 acres. Greenacre, in its
entirety, has a fair market value of $125,000.00. If Creditor A is the
foreclosing creditor, and if the property at the sheriff's sale will bring
more than $100,000.00, Creditor B would be making a serious mistake
in not seeking a second appraisal.
Without a separate appraisal of the 25 acre tract that is subject to
Creditor B's second mortgage, Creditor B will be unable to show what
portion of the sales proceeds are attributable to that tract. If Creditor
B cannot show what portion is attributable to that tract, B will get
nothing out of the sales proceeds. To illustrate, if the 25 acre portion
of Greenacre was a disposal site for hazardous chemical wastes and the
remaining 75 acres housed a large commercial shopping mall, the value
of that 25 acre tract may be minimal. A separate appraisal might have
shown that the 75 acre portion was worth $120,000.00 and the 25 acre
portion was worth only $5,000.00. In such an instance, Creditor A,
whose mortgage covers the entire tract, would be entitled to collect his
$100,000.00 debt out of the $125,000.00 sales price. Creditor B would
84. 522 So. 2d 582 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 526 So. 2d 797 (1988).
85. Disagreeing with the arguments of both parties, the court stated:
Each lot is about the same size. The improvements are located on both lots.
Because each litigant holds a valid second mortgage on one of the two lots
sold at the sheriff's sale, it would be unfair to award the entire sum owed to
one, ignoring the equally valid claim of the other. The only way to an equitable
outcome is to award each party one-half of the remaining funds, thereby
satisfying their equally ranked mortgages.
522 So. 2d at 584.
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be entitled to collect as a secured creditor only $5,000.00 of the remaining
$25,000.00 because that was the extent of his security interest. On the
other hand, if each acre of Greenacre had equal value, then Creditor
B would be entitled to collect all of the $25,000.00 that remained after
the payment of Creditor A's secured debt. Without a separate appraisal,
however, Creditor B would be unable to prove what portion of the
sales price was attributable to the 25 acres to which his security interest
attached and therefore might be precluded from collecting anything as
a secured creditor.
That an inferior creditor whose security interest is not coextensive
with the seizing creditor's rights must obtain a separate appraisal is well-
settled. In Forrey v. Strange,8 6 the Louisiana Supreme Court held that
because there had been no separate appraisal, the vendor, who held an
inferior privilege on several movables owned by the debtor lost that
privilege when the movables were sold en globo with other items that
were not subject to the privilege.
OIL WELLS
In Dahlberg & Co. v. Chevron USA, Inc.,87 the court examined
two issues: who is entitled to claim a lien under the Oil Well Lien Act88
and what kind of evidence is necessary to prove the validity of such a
lien. In Dahlberg a metal galvanizer delivered several metal objects to
a contractor at its onshore facilities. Afterward, the contractor incor-
porated those objects into an offshore drilling platform that it was
constructing for Chevron. When the contractor refused to pay for the
galvanizing work, the galvanizer filed liens on the platforms and sued
Chevron.
The court found that if the supplier knew that the materials were
to be used in connection with oilfield activities, mere proof of delivery
to the contractor was sufficient to meet the lien claimant's burden of
proof. After the supplier proves delivery, the burden shifts to the owner
or leaseholder to prove that the materials were not in fact used on the
oil well site. The court also held that the supplier or other provider of
services, in order to establish the lien, need not deliver its materials or
render its services at the drilling site, particularly if the site is offshore.
According to the court, services performed away from the site may give
rise to a lien if they are not the "kind of service readily performed at
sea." 8 9 The court thus distinguished Gleason v. Twin Cities Drilling
86. 158 La. 941, 105 So. 21 (1925).
87. 836 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1988).
88. La. R.S. 9:4861-67 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
89. 836 F.2d at 918.
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Co.,90 which had held that no lien is available if the activities of the
party claiming the lien are too remote from the jobsite. Dahlberg noted
that the Gleason decision was fifty year's old and involved a service
company, not a materialman or a supplier.
Dahlberg may be viewed as an extension of a rule that the courts
developed in connection with the Private Works Act:9' in order to prove
the existence of his lien, a supplier need only show that he has delivered
the materials to the jobsite; he need not also show that those materials
were actually used in the job. 92 Under the Dahlberg principle, delivery
to a contractor is sufficient proof of the lien as long as the supplier
has knowledge that the contractor will use the materials in connection
with oil field activities. Whether the courts will apply this principle,
which specifically involves offshore drilling, to off-site deliveries in con-
nection with onshore wells remains to be seen.
ATTORNEYS' FEES
Louisiana courts have shown an increasing willingness to examine
the recovery of attorneys' fees. In Leenerts Farms, Inc. v. Rogers,93 the
Louisiana Supreme Court, found that, under its constitutional obligation
and right to police the practice of law, it may inquire into the reason-
ableness of attorneys' fees provisions contained in a note. The supreme
court has rejected attempts to limit the scope of Leenerts Farms, holding
that courts independently may evaluate the amount of attorneys' fees
even if the legislature by statute fixes the attorney's compensation as a
percentage of the total recovery94 and even if the legislature tries to
make the fees part of the creditor's, as opposed to the attorney's,
recovery. 95
No clear rule has emerged in the jurisprudence regarding who has
the burden of proving the reasonableness of attorneys' fees. Some courts
have implied that if the defendant does not introduce evidence showing
that the fees are excessive, then the attorney is not required to inde-
pendently prove their reasonableness.9 6 Other courts, however, have in-
dependently reviewed fee arrangement provisions and either have reduced
90. 183 So. 67 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1938).
91. La. R.S. 9:4801-55 (1983 & Supp. 1988).
92. See Hattiesburg Manuf. Co. v. Pepe, 140 So. 2d 449 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1962).
93. 421 So. 2d 216 (La. 1982).
94. See City of Baton Rouge v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 500 So. 2d 397 (La. 1987).
95. See Central Progressive Bank v. Bradley, 502 So. 2d 1017 (La. 1987), which held
that La. Civ. Code art. 2000, as amended by 1985 La. Acts No. 137 and 1987 La. Acts
No. 883, does.not bar court evaluation of the reasonableness of fees, even in the context
of executory proceedings.




the amount of the fee based upon an independent evaluation of the
time, effort, and quality of the work involved, or have remanded the
case for further evidence. 97
Although there have been numerous cases involving contingency fee
contracts in which courts have tried to allocate fee recovery between a
discharged attorney and a new attorney, most of these cases involved
merely the proper allocation process rather than the reasonableness of
the fees. The premier case in this area is Saucier v. Hayes Dairy Products,
Inc.9 In that case the discharged attorney, who had perfected his lien
rights under the statute that authorizes lawyers to create security interests
by virtue of contingency fee contracts, sought to collect the contingency
fee. The Saucier court concluded that the discharged and the new at-
torneys together were entitled to no more than the greater of the two
contingency fees called for in their respective contracts. Accordingly,
the court divided the larger amount between them.
Recently, Saucier was distinguished in Krampe v. Krampe.99 Krampe
held that the discharged attorney was entitled only to an award in
quantum meruit when there was no proof that the reason for the
discharge was to give the client an unfair advantage over the attorney.
Unfair advantage, for example, might occur when a client who has
signed a fifty percent contingency fee contract fires the first attorney
and then signs a second contract with a new attorney for thirty percent.
Krampe shows the willingness of a court to examine the work performed
under a contingency fee contract.
Another case in which a court independently reviewed the amount
of a contingency fee is Sewell v. Hanover Insurance Co.'° ° In Sewell
there were three separate contingency fee contracts, each for forty per-
cent. Unlike the court in Krampe, the Sewell court did not attempt to
distinguish Saucier. After reviewing the rules of the old Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility, it found that forty percent was the proper
amount to be divided among the lawyers.
Perhaps the most direct assault on the contingency fee contract,
however, is contained in a commercial, as opposed to tort, case. In
Thibaut, Thibaut, Garrett & Bacot v. Smith & Loveless, Inc.,10' the
attorneys claimed that a ten percent contingency contract applied to the
handling of a lien suit. The client contended that the suit was to be
97. See, e.g., Sims v. Hayes, 521 So. 2d 730 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1988); Security Bank
v. Frost, 524 So. 2d 937 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); Rollo v. Lousteau, 522 So. 2d 183
(La. App. 5th Cir. 1988); First Nat'l Bank of Commerce v. Pontchartrain Leasing Co.,
519 So. 2d 262, 264 (La. App. 5th Cir.), writ denied, 520 So. 2d 754 (1988).
98. 373 So. 2d 102 (La. 1978).
99. 510 So. 2d 1289 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 513 So. 2d 824 (1987).
100. 517 So. 2d 413 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
101. 517 So. 2d 222 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
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handled on an hourly basis. Although the attorneys had recovered
$243,360.00 for the client, the court refused to grant the attorneys the
claimed ten percent contingency fee, indicating that such a fee would
be "clearly excessive" in light of the fact that the attorneys spent only
twenty-six hours on the case. The court found that, in the absence of
an evidentiary hearing, the stipulation on hours worked, by itself, was
not sufficient to determine a reasonable fee.
The court reasoned:
[W]e conclude that it is unnecessary to decide whether there
was a valid contingency fee contract in this case. Regardless of
the validity of the contract, it is clear that the [law firm] rendered
valuable services for which it should be compensated but that
the fee provided by the alleged contract would have been ex-
cessive and unreasonable under the circumstances. 0 2
The court apparently assumed that even if there was a valid con-
tingency fee contract, it could independently value and grant the attorney
less than the contract amount if it concluded that those services were
worth less than the contingency fee contract would otherwise bring.
Smith & Loveless indicates that courts may begin to value independently,
and perhaps reduce, the amount of recovery that a tort plaintiff's
attorney would otherwise be entitled to receive under a contingency fee
agreement.
The cases on attorneys' fees are an indication that, even in tort
litigation, an attorney should consider keeping accurate time records. A
clear, explicit, and unambiguous written contract with the client can be
a protection to the attorney who later seeks to recover fees. The attorney
also may need to present evidence of local customs and rates, of the
necessity of post-judgment efforts to collect on judgments, and of com-
pliance with the factors cited in Leenerts Farms.
102. Id at 224.
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